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For more than a decade, the UNROW Human Rights Impact Litigation Clinic at the American University Washington College of Law (UNROW) has been part of a 
global effort to seek justice for the Chagossians, the indigenous 
inhabitants of the Chagos Islands in the Indian Ocean. The 
Chagossians’ plight is not well-
known, yet it repeats a familiar 
narrative from the history of colo-
nialism. The most well-known and 
stark example is perhaps the Trail 
of Tears, when the U.S. government 
ordered the forced removal of the 
Native American nations residing 
in the southeastern parts of North 
America. The world stood by as the 
U.S. governement forcefully and 
violently expelled tens of thou-
sands of Native Americans from 
their homes on a death march—to be resettled in lands west 
of the Mississippi and never to return. Less well-known is that 
merely a few decades ago, in 1967, history would repeat itself 
when the U.K. forcibly expelled thousands of indigenous people 
of the Chagos Archipelago from their homeland to make way for 
a U.S. military base.
Upon learning of the Chagossians’ efforts for justice through 
the U.K. judicial system, as will be discussed below, UNROW 
sought to hold the U.S. government accountable for its involve-
ment in the forced removal of the Chagossians by spearheading 
numerous initiatives in the United States based on the three 
pillars of the clinic’s work: litigation, advocacy, and education. 
UNROW seeks to address human rights violations through liti-
gation, help clients challenge limitations on redress for human 
rights violations in courts, and increase compliance with human 
rights norms and practices. The Clinic’s essential mission is to 
address human rights violations through the model of impact 
litigation, which seeks redress for clients while having a positive 
effect on broader policy issues beyond the immediate scope 
of the litigation. The Chagossian case is an ideal impact case 
for UNROW because it has far-reaching transnational effects 
and implications for any population forcefully removed from 
its territory, and it seeks to challenge continuing tolerance for 
colonial takings. The case has also pro-
vided UNROW the opportunity to take 
action through litigation, advocacy, 
and education. Beginning with litiga-
tion, UNROW filed a lawsuit in 2002 
in the United States District Court 
for the District of Columbia based on 
claims of cruel, inhuman, and degrad-
ing treatment; torture; deprivation of 
property; and discrimination. Citing 
the political question doctrine, which 
prohibits courts from reviewing certain 
executive and legislative decisions, the 
court quickly rejected the case and held that it could not review 
the actions of the Department of Defense, ruling that these 
questions should be left to the other branches of the govern-
ment. UNROW lost on appeal, and the U.S. Supreme Court 
denied certiorari.
Having exhausted all the litigation possibiliites in the United 
States, UNROW initiated an advocacy campaign to seek a 
political response to the Chagossians’ struggle. Fortunately, 
UNROW’s advocacy campaign garnered the attention of the 
Congressional Black Caucus (CBC), an organization represent-
ing the black members of the U.S. Congress, because of the 
colonial nature of the Chagossians’ removal and because the 
Chagossians were primarily of African descent. For two years, 
UNROW met with legislators from the CBC with the aim of 
creating a congressional resolution that would establish a claims 
tribunal to review claims of Chagossians harmed in the course 
of their forced removal. UNROW made enormous progress with 
the help of former CBC chairman Representative Donald Payne, 
who became a champion for the Chagossians’ cause in Congress. 
Unfortunately, Representative Payne passed away shortly before 
he was set to present the resolution before Congress, and other 
representatives from the CBC, who had previously expressed 
interest, quickly dropped out seemingly due to the lack of politi-
cal will and public support for assisting a population the United 
States had helped displace.
Nevertheless, UNROW’s advocacy and education efforts 
on the Chagossians’ behalf did not end there. UNROW orga-
nized many community events to raise awareness about the 
Chagossians, including teach-ins and film screenings, and clinic 
members traveled to Mauritius numerous times to meet with 
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the exiled Chagossian community. UNROW also continued to 
support the litigation and political advocacy efforts of our 
partners abroad. In support of a domestic U.K. case before the 
House of Lords, R (Bancoult) v. Secretary of State for Foreign 
and Commonwealth Affairs (No 2), for example, UNROW 
members traveled to London at the invitation of the U.K. 
Parliament to make a presentation to the Law Lords and address 
the House of Commons.
Believing that the plight of the Chagossian represents the 
quintessential impact litigation case, UNROW continues to 
take part in a global network advocating for the Chagossians. 
Most recently, UNROW filed an online “We the People” 
petition with the White House, asking the U.S. government to 
redress wrongs against the Chagossians.1 More than 30,000 
people signed the petition within the thirty-day time limit. Yet, 
despite this overwhelming support for the Chagossians, the U.S. 
government failed to take 
any responsibility for its role 
in ousting the entire popu-
lation from its homeland.2 
The U.S. government waited 
until December 21, 2012, 
more than eight months, 
before responding to the 
petition, while, in com-
parison, it responded within 
a mere two months to a 
petition seeking funding for 
a Death Star.3 The response 
to the Chagossians’ peti-
tion almost immediately 
followed the European 
Court of Human Rights’s 
(ECtHR or “Court”) deci-
sion in Chagos Islanders v. 
the United Kingdom, issued 
December 20, 2012, that dismissed the Chagossians’ claims as 
inadmissible. ECtHR decisions are influential in informing the 
international community on the development of human rights 
law, so it is likely not a coincidence that the U.S. government’s 
response to the petition followed the ECtHR’s decision so 
closely. Had the Court decided on the merits of the case in the 
Chagossians’ favor, the U.S. government may not have issued as 
dismissive a response due to a risk of political embarassment. 
Due to the the prominence of the ECtHR, the Court’s decision 
in this case has a significant impact on the global effort to seek 
justice on behalf of the Chagossians and could have widespread 
impacts on the claims of indigenous peoples and others forcibly 
removed from their homelands.
The ECtHR is the sole transeuropean judicial organ with 
jurisdiction to hear petitions regarding state violations of the 
European Convention on Human Rights. The Court’s decisions 
are binding on all members of the Council of Europe, including 
the U.K. However, because of the sheer number of petitions 
for review and the delicate balance with the Member States’ 
sovereignty concerns, the Court will only hear cases that meet 
certain pre-conditions for jurisdiction. In the Chagos Islanders 
case, the Court found that the pre-conditions had not been 
met, and refused to hear the merits of the Chagossians’ claims, 
finding the case inadmissible. This article will argue that the 
Court based its decision on rationales that threaten to not only 
undermine the global campaign of the Chagossians and their 
allies, but also damage the effort to strengthen international law 
and hold governments accountable for human rights abuses. It 
will further describe why the claim of the Chagossians to their 
homeland has vast potential for impact, the crux of UNROW’s 
mission, due to the relatively few decisions in the ECtHR on 
indigenous peoples’ rights and the Courts’ limited jurisprudence 
on collective rights to redress.
History of tHe CHagos islands
The Chagos Archipelago comprises 55 islands and is 
currently claimed by the U.K. as a British Indian Ocean Territory 
(BIOT).4 From the 1500s to the 1960s, the Chagossian popula-
tion consisted of families of African, Malagasy, and Indian 
origin, mostly brought over 
as slaves to work on planta-
tions.5 These families and 
their descendents made 
Chagos their home and by 
the 1960s even the U.K. 
government recognized the 
Chagossians as indigenous 
to the land.6 Nevertheless, 
in the 1960s the U.K. made 
an agreement with the U.S. 
government to forcibly 
deport the Chagossians in 
order to grant the United 
States access to Diego 
Garcia, the largest island, 
for a fifty-year term with 
the possibility of a twenty-
year extension, to use as a 
military base.7 The authori-
ties employed brutal tactics to force thousands of the Chagossians 
from their homes, including an embargo aimed at starving the 
population, the mass extermination of the Chagossians’ pet 
dogs, and even death threats to any opposition groups.8 Today 
most Chagossians live in abject poverty on the island nations 
of Mauritius and the Seychelles because they were forcibly 
removed from their home with little to no compensation and no 
ability to return.9
Following their violent removal, the Chagossians have 
made several unsucessful attempts to regain control of their 
homeland.10 For example, in 1975 a Chagossian named Michel 
Ventacassen brought a case in the High Court in London con-
cerning the expulsions.11 The Ventacassen case settled in 1982, 
and over the next two years, 1,344 Chagossians in Mauritius, 
only a part of the exiled Chagossian population, received GBP 
2,976 each in compensation, a derisory amount in light of the 
magnitude of their loss.12 In addition, several families received 
no compensation and many staged hunger strikes to show 
their disapproval of the failure of the U.K. government to truly 
provide redress for their loss.13 The approximately 500 
Chagossians in the Seychelles who did not participate in the 
negotiations received nothing.14 To receive the funds, the 
Construction of a cinema in a village in Diego Garcia. Photo courtesy  
UK Royal Air Force.
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Chagossians were required to sign renunciation forms written 
in English, a language most of them did not understand.15
In pursuit of full and adequate compensation and recogni-
tion of their struggle after the dissapointing 1975 judgement, 
the Chagossians brought forced expulsion claims in a separate 
litigation through the domestic U.K. courts, attempting to gain 
a remedy and recognition. In a rare victory for the Chagossians, 
in 2004 the U.K. court held that the orders, removing the 
Chagossians from their land, were beyond the lawful powers 
of the sovereign.16 In 2007, the Court of Appeals ruled that the 
decision to pass the 2004 British Indian Ocean Territory Orders 
was an abuse of power by the Crown.17 In 2008, however, the 
majority of the House of Lords decided that the Queen had the 
power to exile the entire population of the Chagos archipelago 
because the British Indian Ocean Territory was not a settled 
colony.18 In 2010, ECtHR began the investigation into the case 
of the Chagossians right of return, yet this attempt proved to be 
another disappointment.19
The eCThR DeCision: Chagos Islanders v.  
the UnIted KIngdom—The LaTesT DeniaL  
of The Chagossians’ fighT foR JusTiCe
In Chagos Islanders v. the United Kingdom, the ECtHR 
delared the case inadmissible and thus declined to consider 
the merits of the Chagossians’ claims. The ECtHR will only 
hear arguments on the merits of a petition if applicants meet 
certain preconditions of admissability.20 First, the cases can 
only be brought to the Court after domestic remedies, such as 
attempts for justice through national judicial systems, have been 
exhausted.21 Secondly, the applicant must be a victim who has 
suffered significant harm, and this harm must concern one of 
the rights protected under the European Convention on Human 
Rights (Convention).22 If an act or omission at issue directly 
affects the applicant then he or she is considered a victim under 
the Convention.23 Third, the applicant must bring the case within 
six months of the last domestic decision and the claims must be 
related to a right guaranteed by the Convention.24
The ECtHR found the Chagossian case inadmissible for 
several reasons. First, the Court held that because 471 of the 
applicants had participated in the Ventacassen case and already 
accepted and received compensation in the Ventacassen case, 
none of the applicants could claim victim status.25 Second, the 
Court held that the applicants who were not among the 471 
who received compensation should have been aware of the 
proceedings and made the appropriate claims; therefore, they 
failed to exhaust domestic remedies.26 Third, the Court found 
that applicants who were not born at the time of the settlement 
were not residents of the island and accordingly had no claims to 
“victim status” arising out of the expulsions.27 Finally, the Court 
did not find any indication of arbitrariness or unfairness in the 
national court proceedings that could be construed as a denial 
of access to court; therefore, the Court found the application 
inadmissible. 28
The impact of the ECtHR’s decision reaches far beyond the 
Chagossians. The ECtHR could have set a precedent that would 
protect the rights of indigenous peoples who have been expelled 
from their land by colonial powers and provide them an avenue 
for redress. Instead, this decision failed to protect the collective 
population’s rights and set a precedent indicating that if certain 
members of a harmed population receive compensation, then 
all other current and future members are barred from recovery. 
Beyond that, this decision indicated that colonial powers’ expul-
sion of indigenous or aboriginal populations would escape the 
Court’s scrutiny as long as the colonial power makes a nominal 
payment to the removed population with the condition that 
acceptance of the payment functions as a waiver of the right to 
return. This type of decision is particularly harmful to impact 
litigators because it completely bars certain groups of victims 
from ever receiving reparations.
The CouRT founD The Case inaDmissibLe beCause iT 
DiD noT gRanT ViCTim sTaTus To The Chagossians
The ECtHR based its finding of inadmissibility largely on its 
determination that the Chagossians did not qualify as victims. 
Under Article 34 of the European Convention, all individuals 
who consider themselves victims of a breach of the Convention 
can complain to the Court.29 To qualify as a direct victim, the 
act or omission at issue must directly affect the applicant.30 The 
Court has held that “[w]here applicants accept a sum of compen-
sation in settlement of civil claims and renounce further use of 
local remedies, . . . they will generally no longer be able to claim 
to be a victim in respect of those matters.”31 However, the Court 
has previously applied this standard to individual applicants 
rather than groups. The Court’s decision created a disapointing 
precedent that extends this individual standard to group litigants 
without taking into account the special circumstances of a group 
claim.
As an impact litigation clinic, UNROW often advocates for 
courts to apply legal standards that either do not yet exist or are 
not widely used. In the present case, UNROW argues that the 
Court should have developed a new legal standard to evaluate 
victim status for group litigants rather than apply the rule that 
denies victim status when an individual has participated in a 
past settlement agreement. By failing to develop a rule based 
on the unique circumstance of group litigants, the Court denied 
hundreds of Chagossians the opportunity to seek redress merely 
because some members of the group had previously received 
nominal compensation.
The Court’s failure to take into consideration the unique 
circumstances of group litigants does not only affect the 
[The ECtHR’s] decision failed to protect the collective population’s rights and 
set a precedent indicating that if certain members of a harmed population receive 
compensation, then all other current and future members are barred from recovery.
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Chagossians—it also severely limits all group litigants’ ability 
to seek redress in the future. The Court denied the Chagossians 
victim status because 471 of the 1,786 applicants received 
compensation in the 1982 Ventacassen settlement.32 In reaching 
this decision, the Court relied on previous judgements that 
involved individual rather than group applicants. For example, 
in Caraher v. the United Kingdom, where the Court found 
that the applicant did not qualify as a victim because she had 
accepted a settlement offer in the civil proceedings for the death 
of her husband.33 However, the distinction between cases like 
Caraher and that of the Chagossians is more significant than 
the Court gave credit. In Caraher 
the party in question did receive 
some form of compensation yet 
only 471 of the 1,786 applicant 
Chagossians participated in the 
earlier settlement agreement34—
the remaining 1,315 applicants 
never received compensation and 
some did not even participate.35 
UNROW contends that instead 
of applying a narrow ruling that previously applied to whether 
invidiual victims were compensated, the Court should have 
either identified a distinct rationale specific to large groups of 
victims or, more appropriately, taken into account individuals 
who never received any compensation.
Second, UNROW contends that when the Court denied 
the applicants victim status by giving undue deference to the 
Chagossians’ supposed waiver of their right to pursue claims 
against the U.K. government, the Court acted inconsistent with 
the European Convention’s purpose of protecting and defending 
fundamental rights and freedoms. The Court upheld the validity 
of the renunciation forms some of the Chagossians signed in the 
Ventacassen settlement even though many of the signers were, 
in the words of the ECtHR, “illiterate, Creole-speaking and 
vulnerable and did not appreciate what they were signing.”36 The 
Court deferred to the U.K. High Court’s earlier rejection of the 
Chaggosians’ arguments, despite the High Court’s recognition 
that many of the Chagossians were illiterate, “lacked significant 
education,” and that “[l]egal concepts were, not surprisingly, 
poorly understood.”37 By refusing to evaluate the validity of the 
Chagossians’ waiver of their rights, the Court opened the door 
for future groups to take advantage of vulnerable populations. 
UNROW advocates for a more thorough evaluation of whether 
the Chagossians’ waiver was knowing and intelligent.
Finally, the Court caused significant harm to the new genera-
tion of applicants, who are descendents of those expelled from 
the island, by failing to view them as victims in this case. As 
stated in the Court’s practical guide on admissibility criteria, 
“[T]he Court may accept an individual application from a 
person considered an indirect victim, where there is a personal 
and specific link between the direct victim and the applicant.”38 
The Court has developed a complicated jurisprudence for which 
it is difficult to prescribe with precision what a “specific link” 
means, but it is clear that family relationships play a signficant 
role39 and the Court could have construed a broad definition of 
“indirect victim” to include the “specifc link” of the descendants. 
This decision has serious implications for future generations of 
displaced persons because denying these Chagossians access to 
the Court creates a legal standard for admissibility rulings that 
will inevitably disfavor other groups seeking redresss.
The Court’s decision on this issue presents an important 
advocacy opportunity because applying the Court’s narrow 
understanding of who qualifies as an indirect victim would 
restrict the rights of other such individuals or groups attempting 
to gain access to the Court. Under this standard, the rights of 
descendent family members of direct victims to access the Court 
would be severely limited. Furthermore, if the Court is presented 
with future cases in which an entire population has been force-
fully removed from its territory, only members of the population 
who actually resided on the terri-
tory at the time of removal would 
be authorized to bring claims 
before the Court. The Court could 
better serve victims by utilizing a 
broader reading of the definition 
of victim in the practical guide 
to provide access to justice to all 
who qualify, as the current ruling 
is harmful to the Chagossians and will certainly affect future 
victims attempting to obtain justice through the Court.
The CourT Should have ProTeCTed The ChagoSSianS’ 
unique righTS aS indigenouS PeoPleS
UNROW also uses impact litigation and advocacy to 
strengthen compliance with international law. In that capacity, 
UNROW argues that the Court in the present case would better 
serve its role in defending vicims by providing the Chagossians 
the special protection developed under international law to 
protect indigenous peoples, as the Chagossians are the native 
inhabitants of the Chagos Islands.40 International law, specifi-
cally the provisions of the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
and the work of the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination as expressed in General Recommendation XXIII 
on Indigenous Peoples, has widely recognized the rights of 
indigenous peoples.41 In 2007, the United Nations adopted the 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Declaration).42 
Notably, 143 states, including the U.K., voted in favor of the 
Declaration.43 Although the Declaration is not legally binding, 
it serves as a benchmark for customary international law, and as 
“a guide for the actions of the international human rights treaty 
bodies.”44 The Declaration includes the “right not to be forcibly 
removed from land or territories” and “the right to redress 
for lands, territories, and resources which have been taken.”45 
UNROW asserts that these principles of international law would 
be effective guides for the Court to develop its jurisprudence 
toward indigenous peoples.
The Court had persuasive authority for interpretion of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) in the work 
of other regional courts, which have issued decisions that offer 
a differing representation of these developing international 
norms. For example, the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights (IACtHR), another regional human rights court that can 
hear individual petitions against a state, has incorporated the 
Declaration in its jurisprudence to provide indigenous peoples 
the special rights required under customary international law.46 
The IACtHR has read Article 21 of the American Convention 
The Court could better serve victims 
by utilizing a broader reading of the 
definition of victim[.]
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on Human Rights to recognize the “close relationship between 
indigenous people and their lands,” and has expanded on this 
to protect the rights of indigenous people, despite the lack of a 
clear statement of what those rights entail under the American 
Convention.47 In Kichwa People of Sarayaku v. Ecuador, the 
IACtHR found that “the Ecuadorian state violated the [Sarayaku 
Indigenous] community’s right to be consulted, as well as their 
community property rights and their cultural identity.”48 The 
IACtHR’s ruling was based in part on the right to property laid 
out in the American Convention on Human Rights, which states, 
“No one shall be deprived of his property except upon payment 
of just compensation, for reasons of public utility or social 
interest, and . . . according to the forms established by law.”49 
The European Convention provides an almost identical right to 
property and thus the IACtHR standards would provide an effec-
tive template for interpretation of customary international law.50
By incorporating the specicial 
protection that international law 
affords indigenous peoples in its 
jurisprudence, the ECtHR would 
ensure that Chagossians and other 
indigenous groups have access 
to redress for the full extent 
of the harm inflicted against 
them. Similar to the IACtHR, 
the ECtHR has the responsibilty 
to recognize the importance of 
indigenous communities’ right 
to be consulted and communaly 
owned property.51 Expanding the ECtHR’s current interpretation 
of property rights would benefit the Chagossians as well as 
other indigenous groups seeking recognition of their unique and 
longstanding rights related to their territory.
The Court’s decision not to consider the Chagossians’ 
rights as indigenous people once again demonstrates the case’s 
importance within an impact litigation setting. The ECtHR has 
had much less opportunity develop standards than the Inter-
American System, for which indigenous rights is one of its 
more developed subjects. Much of the international guidance 
on indigenous rights has come within the last decade, and this 
case presented the ECtHR with a chance to follow the example 
of the IACtHR and incorporate these relatively new principles 
of customary international law into its jurisprudence. The 
Court, however, failed to take advantage of this opportunity and 
instead demonstrated its reluctance to strengthen customary 
international law and guarantee indigenous rights.
The CourT’s DeCision impliCiTly enDorses  
a ConTinuing Colonial menTaliTy BeCause The  
CourT Fails To Take The Claims oF The Chaggossians 
inTo ConsiDeraTion
Another troubling aspect of the Court’s decision, particularly 
given the deference afforded to the U.K.’s supposed “compensa-
tion,” settlement of the Chagossians’ claims, and the failure to 
recognize the protection that should be afforded to indigenous 
populations, is the Court’s tacit endorsement of the underlying 
colonial mentality. Although the Court noted the “callous and 
shameful treatment which [the Chagossians] suffered,”52 the 
Court found that the Chagossians “could no longer claim to be 
victims”53 merely because the U.K. government offered them 
incomplete and nominal compensation. While the Chagossians 
accepted the compensation, the harm done to them has yet to be 
sufficiently redressed.
In reaching this decision, the Court emphasized the supposed 
adequate compensation given to some of the Chagossians, many 
of which were not part of the ECtHR litigation, as well as their 
supposed renunciation of their right to return to their homeland. 
The situation echoed familiar narratives from the colonial era 
in European history, when indigenous populations were offered 
nominal and incomplete compensation, in the absence of choice, 
for the forceful taking of their homelands. Once this payment 
was accepted—even if absent choice or consensus from the 
entire populace—the colonial power treated the indigenous 
population as having renounced 
their rights to return to their 
homeland. By ruling that the 
U.K.’s nominal payment to only 
part of the forcibly removed pop-
ulation is sufficient to preempt 
the Chagossians from bringing 
their claim before the ECtHR, 
the Court’s ruling essentially 
endorsed this colonial mentality 
and behavior.
Under this ruling, a colonial 
power, such as the U.K., could 
legally remove an indigenous 
population from its homeland as long as the colonial power 
makes a symbolic payment, even if this payment does not 
actually remedy the losses, damages, or injuries incurred. 
Furthermore, this ruling allows the colonial power to bar the 
victims’ claims by assuming informed consent where the 
victims accepted payment and waiver, and does not require 
the Court to take into account the factual circumstances such 
as a lack of comprehension due to language barriers, and does 
not require the Court to look at the amount of payment offered 
compared to the amount of harm done. Under this ruling, a 
colonial power can make a waiver of claims a condition for 
accepting the payment, as the U.K. did with the Chagossians, 
even if the payees do not fully understand what they are signing 
away because the Court will presume informed consent where 
payment, waiver, and counsel were present. A better standard 
would be to presume a lack of informed consent in these situa-
tions given the historic willingness of colonial powers to overtake 
lands regardless of interests of the indigenous people. This is a 
troubling ruling, considering the prevalence of wrongs that were 
committed against indigenous peoples throughout history in this 
context. The Court’s callous disregard for the Chagossians who 
never received any compensation makes this decision all the 
more disconcerting.
Furthermore, the Court’s decision suggests that any colonial 
power could simply give nominal compensation for the forceful 
removal of a population and, in doing so, effectively foreclose 
any claims that the victims would have otherwise been entitled 
to under the Convention. This is a troubling holding that greatly 
undermines the protection of human rights under the Convention 
By ruling that the U.K.’s nominal 
payment . . . is sufficient to preempt 
the Chagossians from bringing their 
claim before the ECtHR, the Court’s 
ruling essentially endorsed this 
colonial mentality and behavior.
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and the legitimacy of the Court. UNROW, along with many 
advocating on behalf of the Chagossians, questions whether the 
Court’s rationale was based on legal principles or the Court’s 
desire to avoid inflaming political sensitivities. Regardless of the 
reasons for its refusal to hear the case on the merits, the Court 
has now acted as a rubber stamp for a European power’s grievous 
wrongs against an indigenous population.
ConClusion
The Chagossians’ story stands out because, unlike other 
examples of colonial takings, it cannot be relegated to ancient 
history. Thus, the Court’s careless treatment of the Chagos 
Islanders v. the United Kingdom case is all the more relevant and 
troubling. By finding that nominal compensation and unknowing 
waiver could bar an entire population from seeking justice, the 
Court did great damage to the development of international rule 
of law with respect to the protection of indigenous populations.
Despite international recognition that forcefully removing a 
poulation from its territory violates international law, the Court 
implicitly endorsed a continuation of an all too familiar colonial 
narrative. In reaching its short-shrift decision ruling the case 
inadmissible, the Court found that an entire population had 
relinquished their right to their homeland simply because the 
colonial power had given them a nominal amount of compensa-
tion that came attached with an unknown waiver.
The Court should correct its approach and bring its juris-
prudence in line with customary international law and other 
regional courts to avoid further injustice. Indigenous popula-
tions receive special protection under customary international 
law, and greater injustice could result if the Court overlooks 
the problems in this decision and fails to adapt its approach to 
conform with international standards. The Court will face new 
claims from indigenous populations and other group applicants 
and should change its analysis to ensure that other groups are not 
denied the ability to obtain justice.
This case is not the end of the legal road for the Chagossians, 
nor the end of their struggle to return home. For example, the 
lease on the Chagos Islands is coming up for review in 2016, 
which presents an opportunity for the global community to rally 
behind the Chagossians and inform the U.S. and U.K. govern-
ments that they must not continue this unacceptable colonial 
practice. This grievous injustice needs attention, and it is up to 
the relevant bodies to ensure that similar subsequent cases do 
not follow this troubling piece of jurisprudence. Unfortunately, 
world leaders can now point to this ECtHR decision and declare 
that the Chagossians’ claims are, as ruled by the Court, invalid. 
It is in situations like these that advocates of human rights 
must persevere in the effort to advance the development of 
international human rights law in a direction that leads to greater 
protection for all individuals—including the little-known and 
disenfranchised Chagossians who hailed from a forgotten island 
in the center of the Indian Ocean.
USS Saratoga moored at a port in Diego Garcia. Photo courtesy  
US Navy.
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